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An "Interesting" Provision Concerning
Exchange Rate Arrangements
This article is inspired by a comment made by Joseph Gold in December 1975.
On December 15 of that year, he, as General Counsel of the International
Monetary Fund, and Jacques J. Polak, as Economic Counselor, briefed the IMF
Executive Board on a meeting held three days earlier of the Deputies of the
Group of Ten in Paris. At the G- 10 Paris meeting, the French and United States
representatives had presented their long-awaited agreed text of a new article IV
on exchange rate arrangements to be incorporated into the amended Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. During the briefing of the IMF
Executive Board, Mr. Gold referred to one provision in the proposed article IV
as "the interesting Section 2(c)."'
I. Background
As many readers are aware, the text of article IV was the product of intense
negotiations in the fall of 1975 (some seventeen meetings over three months)
between Edwin H. Yeo III, then U.S. Under Secretary of the Treasury, and
Jacques de Larosire, then Director of the Treasury of France.2 While both
France and the United States desired greater stability in the exchange markets,
they differed about preferred exchange arrangements. The United States was
determined to assure that the U.S. dollar would never again, in law or in fact,
be the center hub in a system of fixed (even if "adjustable") exchange rates
(that is, the currency against which other IMF members would set official
values of their currencies) as had been the case in the former Bretton Woods
*Professor of Law, The University of Toledo, Toledo, Ohio.
1. Minutes of IMF Executive Board Meeting of Dec. 15, 1975, IMF Doc. EBM/75/196 (1975)
at 3, reprinted in 2 DoCuMENTs RELATING TO THE SECOND AMENDMENT OF THE ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT
OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FuND 2004, 2006 (1980) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS].
2. See generally 2 M. DE VRIES, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 1972-1978: COOPERATION
ON TRIAL 736-62 (1985); R. EDwARDs, INTERNATIONAL MONTrARY COLLABORATION 502-07 (1985).
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par value system.3 The United States wished to preserve a role for the play of
supply and demand in exchange markets to determine the exchange rates
between the U.S. dollar and the currencies issued by its major trading
partners.
France, at the opposite pole, was determined that the international monetary
system move toward a regime of stable but adjustable exchange rates, even if it
was not possible to put such a regime into place promptly.4 The draft text of
article IV that resulted from the negotiations emphasized the shared desire for a
more stable exchange system, and it compromised the differences. The U.S.-
French draft, with some modifications, was incorporated into the Second
Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the IMF as the new article IV
entitled "Obligations Regarding Exchange Arrangements. ' ' 5 The Second
Amendment became effective on April 1, 1978.6
Section 1 of article IV states a number of general obligations to which all
members of the International Monetary Fund are committed at all times. Among
these obligations is the fundamental one: "each member undertakes to collab-
orate with the Fund and other members to assure orderly exchange arrangements
and to promote a stable system of exchange rates."
3. For a description of the Bretton Woods par value system of exchange rates and its ultimate
collapse in the period 1971-73, see R. EDWARDS, supra note 2, at 491-501 and citations therein;
J. GOLD, EXCHANGE RATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 27-74 (1988) [hereinafter
EXCHANGE RATES].
4. See supra note 2. Drafts of art. IV presented by France, by the United States, and by the IMF
staff to the IMF Executive Board in the Spring of 1975. 3 M. DE VIES, supra note 2, at 287-300;
1 DoCUMENTS, supra note 1, at 471-78, 668-81, 765-80, 841-46, 870-73, 945-50.
5. Agreement between France and the United States on art. IV was announced at the Economic
Summit Conference at the Chiteau de Rambouillet in France in November 1975. The draft text was
presented to a meeting of the Deputies of the Group of Ten in Paris on December 11-12, 1975.
During the following week, Joseph Gold, working with representatives of France and the United
States, made revisions in the draft. See M. DE VRIEs, supra note 2, at 748-49i Gold, Strengthening
the Soft International Law of Exchange Arrangements, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. [A.J.I.L.] 443, 452-56
(1983) [hereinafter Gold, Strengthening], reprinted in 2 J. GOLD, LEGAL AND INsTrrIMONAL ASPECTS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: SELECTED ESSAYS 515, 528-33 (1984) [hereinafter ESSAYS].
Hereinafter Gold, Strengthening, is cited to both the original version in A.J.I.L. and the reprinted
version in ESSAYS. See also EXCHANGE RATES, supra note 3, at 89-94, 118-19, 200-02, 215,
317-20.
The revised text was then presented to the IMF's Executive Board. IMF Doc. DAA/74/24 (1975),
reprinted in 1 DocumENrs, supra note 1, at 1644-51. The Executive Board approved it with some
further modifications on December 23, 1975. It was submitted to the IMF's Interim Committee at its
meeting in Kingston, Jamaica, in January 1976. Thereafter, the Second Amendment, incorporating
the new art. IV, was approved by the IMF's Board of Governors for submission to the member
countries for acceptance.
6. The Second Amendment substituted a complete new text of articles and schedules for the
former text. The text of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, as amended
effective April 1, 1978 [hereinafter IMF Articles of Agreement], appears at 29 U.S.T. 2204, T.I.A.S.
No. 8937. For the original articles, adopted June 22, 1944, entered into force Dec. 27, 1945, see 60
Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39. For the First Amendment, effective July 28, 1969,
see 20 U.S.T. 2775, T.I.A.S. No. 6748, 726 U.N.T.S. 266.
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Sir Joseph Gold has described section 1 as stating "soft" law. 7 This author has
argued elsewhere that, despite the generality of the language used, section 1
imposes significant legal obligations.
8
Section 3 of article IV grants authority to the IMF, indeed imposes a duty upon
it, to oversee the international monetary system and the compliance of each
member country with its section 1 obligations. The Fund has a duty to engage in
firm surveillance over the exchange rate policies of members and to adopt
principles for the guidance of all members concerning exchange rate policies.
9
So far only one decision stating guiding principles has been adopted and it is
phrased at a high level of generality.'o
II. A Close Look at Section 2(c)
Section 2 of article IV is entitled "General Exchange Arrangements."
Subsection (b) of that section describes arrangements that were acceptable during
the period when the Second Amendment was being brought into force:
Under an international monetary system of the kind prevailing on January 1, 1976,
exchange arrangements may include (i) the maintenance by a member of a value for its
currency in terms of the special drawing right or another denominator, other than gold,
selected by the member, or (ii) cooperative arrangements by which members maintain
the value of their currencies in relation to the value of the currency or currencies of
other members, or (iii) other exchange arrangements of a member's choice. 1
7. See Gold, Strengthening, supra note 5, A.J.I.L. at 452-54, ESSAYS at 527-30; see also
EXCHANGE RATES, supra note 3, at 89-112.
8. Edwards, The Currency Exchange Rate Provisions of the Proposed Amended Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 722, 734-46, 757-59 (1976); R.
EDWARDS, supra note 2, at 507-21, 566-68, 605-07.
9. See R. EDWARDS, supra note 2, at 519-21, 558-68; EXCHANGE RATES, supra note 3, at
317-52.
10. IMF Executive Board Decision No. 5392 (77/63) (Apr. 29, 1977, effective Apr. 1, 1978)
[hereinafter Executive Board Decision no. 5392]; 1977 IMF ANN. REP. 107-09; SELECTED DECISIONS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 9-14 (13th issue 1987). For
discussion, see R. EDWARDS, supra note 2, at 519-21; EXCHANGE RATES, supra note 3, at 387-93;
Gold, Strengthening, supra note 5, A.J.I.L. at 465-73, EssAYs at 545-54.
Section 3(b) of art. IV states that the principles adopted shall be "for the guidance of all
members" (emphasis added) and shall be consistent with the right of members to choose their own
exchange arrangements that are consistent with the purposes of the fund and with the obligations of
sec. 1.
11. IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 6, art. IV, sec. 2(b).
The text of sec. 2(b) in the U.S.-French draft of art. IV submitted to the Deputies of the Group
of Ten in Paris in early December 1975, before its revision by the working group chaired by Joseph
Gold, read as follows:
Under the present functioning of the system such arrangements may include
maintenance by a member of a value for its currency in terms of the special drawing
right or other denominator, other than gold, selected by the member; may include
maintenance by a group of members of mechanisms under which each member of such
group maintains the value of its currency in relation to other members of such group;
and may include other exchange arrangements of a member's choice. Gold,
Strengthening, supra note 5, A.J.I.L. at 455, ESSAYS at 530.
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While section 2(b) has been called "codified anarchy,"' 2 it was not intended
to be a permanent regime. It uses a specific date for reference. Use of the date,
January 1, 1976, avoided the necessity to describe or define the then-functioning
international monetary system. More importantly, in this author's view, the use
of a time reference highlights the expectation of future change and evolution in
the international monetary system.
Section 4 of article IV of the IMF Agreement authorizes the Fund to institute
the par value system provided for in schedule C to the Agreement. The system
would have a common denominator in relation to which member countries would
express par values for their currencies. Exchange rates would be maintained on
the basis of those values. Overall, the system is similar to but more flexible than
the par value system of the former Articles of Agreement. 13 In order to institute
the par value system, the Fund must determine, by an 85 percent weighted
majority vote,14 that "international economic conditions permit the introduction
of a widespread system of exchange arrangements based on stable but adjustable
par values."' 5 Section 4 is loaded with factors that the Fund is to consider in
making the determination:
The Fund shall make the determination on the basis of the underlying stability of the
world economy, and for this purpose shall take into account price movements and rates
of expansion in the economies of members. The determination shall be made in light
of the evolution of the international monetary system, with particular reference to sources
of liquidity, and, in order to ensure the effective operation of a system of par values,
to arrangements under which both members in surplus and members in deficit in their
balances of payments take prompt, effective, and symmetrical action to achieve ad-
justment, as well as to arrangements for intervention and the treatment of imbalances. 16
It should be apparent from the text quoted above, that the list of factors is long
enough and contains enough troublesome considerations, so that section 4 is
unlikely to be invoked without a great deal of preparatory work. Schedule C may
well stand more as an example of one possible future stable-rate system than as
a regime that is actually to be applied.
If the Fund is going to have a role in harmonizing and unifying exchange rate
arrangements, the vehicle is unlikely to be section 4 of article IV. This leads to
consideration of the "interesting" section 2(c). The section in the original U.S.-
French draft read: "The Fund may by an 85 percent majority of the total voting
power modify as appropriate the general exchange arrangements established
under this Article."'
7
12. Kenen, Techniques to Control International Reserves, in THE NEW INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
SYSTEM 202, 208 (R. Mundell & J. Polak eds. 1977).
13. See generally EXCHANGE RATES, supra note 3, at 195-224.
14. Voting in the IMF is explained in R. EDWARDS, supra note 2, at 32-35.
15. IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 6, art. IV, sec. 4.
16. Id.
17. EXCHANGE RATES, supra note 3, at 118; Gold, Strengthening, supra note 5, A.J.I.L. at
454-55, ESSAYS at 530.
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This provision, had it been adopted without change, would have enabled the
Executive Board of the IMF, if the voting majority were mustered, to legislate
exchange arrangements binding on all members. Joseph Gold, as General Counsel
of the IMF, found the idea of enabling the Fund to develop new general exchange
arrangements, that would replace the loosely defined arrangements in section 2(b),
to be attractive. He was, however, troubled by the idea of giving the Executive Board
power to impose new and unknown obligations on member countries without the
necessity for approval of the particular exchange commitments by national legisla-
tures in those countries that require such approval for a country to undertake major
new international obligations, especially if there is also an impact in domestic law. 
18
A working group, consisting of Mr. Gold and representatives of France and
the United States, changed the language quoted above. 19 The revised text, with
a minor change, 20 became the final version. Section 2(c) reads:
To accord with the development of the international monetary system, the Fund, by
an eighty-five percent majority of the total voting power,21 may make provision for
general exchange arrangements without limiting the right of members to have exchange
arrangements of their choice consistent with the purposes of the Fund and the
obligations under Section 1 of this Article. 22
The above language, which is the language now in article IV, provides im-
portant enabling powers to the Fund, but the Fund's actions under the revised
section 2(c) do not have the compelling force of the original U.S.-French draft.
The requirement of an 85 percent majority vote in the original draft is nevertheless
retained. The Report of the Executive Directors to the Board of Governors on the
Second Amendment devotes only two sentences to section 2(c):
Section 2(c) enables the Fund, by an eighty-five percent majority of the total voting
power, to recommend general exchange arrangements that accord with the development
of the [international monetary] system. This action of the Fund, however, could not limit
in any way the right of members to have exchange arrangements of their choice consistent
with the purposes of the Fund and the obligations of members under section 1.23
Although the quotation above uses the word "recommend," that word does
not appear anywhere in the text of section 2. Section 2(c) enables the Fund to
18. Gold, Strengthening, supra note 5, A.J.I.L. at 454-55, ESSAYS at 530-31.
19. For background on the drafting of sec. 2(c), see Gold, Strengthening, supra note 5, A.J.I.L.
at 454-55, ESSAYS at 530-31.
20. For the revised draft text of art. IV (including sec. 2(c)) submitted to the IMF Executive
Board on December 19, 1975, see IMF Doc. DAA/75/24 (1975), reprinted in I DOCUMENTS, supra
note 1, at 1644-51. The final words in the draft of art. IV, sec. 2(c), "under Article IV, Section 1,"
were edited to read "under Section 1 of this Article" in the final version.
21. See supra note 14.
22. IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 6, art. IV, sec. 2(c). For discussions of the purposes
of the Fund and the legal character of the obligations of art. IV, sec. 1, to which reference is made
in sec. 2(c), see R. EDWARDS, supra note 2, at 1I-12, 507-31, 566-68; see also supra note 7.
23. Exac. DIR. OF THE BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE IMF, PROPOSED SECOND AMENDMENT TO THE
ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: A REPORT BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS
TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS pt. II, sec. C, para. 4 (1976); 1976 PROCEEDINGS, IMF, Supp. at 14.
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"make provision for" general exchange arrangements. This phrase is not
synonymous with "recommend" and implies a more active and creative role for
the Fund. If the Fund makes provision for general exchange arrangements that
include, for example, stable exchange rates based on central rates with the SDR
as the common denominator, and the vast majority of members participate in that
system, the type of alternate arrangement (for example, a floating rate arrange-
ment) that a nonparticipating member will be able in fact to choose for itself,
consistent with its section 1 obligations, may be limited. The collaboration
obligation of section 1, if it is to mean anything in the context of section 2(c),
would require that the floating arrangement harmonize with the general stable-
rate exchange arrangements.
24
Having examined the character of the Fund's authority under section 2(c), the
next step is to consider what the phrase "general exchange arrangements"
encompasses. "General Exchange Arrangements" is the title of section 2 in
which the subsection being discussed appears. Thus, the "codified anarchy" 25 of
section 2(b), quoted earlier,2 6 applicable to "an international monetary system of
the kind prevailing on January 1, 1976," should be understood as "general
exchange arrangements." These particular arrangements are about as loose a set
of "general exchange arrangements" as one can imagine.
At the other extreme would be arrangements involving a shared world
monetary instrument, issued by a central institution like the IMF, that would
operate not only at the international level but penetrate into national economies.
This monetary instrument would be the standard of value and principal means of
payment used in official transactions. It would also be the standard of value in
private international and domestic transactions, and instruments modeled on it
could be the means of payment in those transactions. It would supplant at least
some of the functions of national currencies. It is conceivable that the ECU could
evolve into this dominant role in its regional sphere. 27 Evolution of the SDR into
such an instrument is more problematic.28
24. An IMF member that chooses exchange arrangements for itself that differ from those
provided for in a Fund decision under sec. 2(c), would appear to enjoy no greater freedom than a
member that decides not to establish a par value for its currency after sch. C is applied. The same
substantive test for compatibility of alternate arrangements is used in art. IV, sec. 2(c), and in sch.
C, para. 3: consistency with the purposes of the Fund and with obligations under art. IV, sec. 1.
Consultations of the Fund with the "nonparticipant" under sec. 3 of art. IV can be as wide-ranging
and intensive as those contemplated in sch. C, para. 3.
25. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
26. See supra note It and accompanying text.
27. See Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union [chaired by Jacques Delors],
Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community 45-49 (Apr. 12, 1989);
see also R. EDWARDS, supra note 2, at 342-45; IMF, THE ROLE OF THE SDR mI THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM 29-41 (IMF Occasional Paper No. 51, 1987) [hereinafter ROLE OF SDR].
28. See R. COOPER, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SysimM: ESSAYS IN WORLD ECONOMICS 239-78
(1987); R. EDWARDS, supra note 2, at 635-42; J. POLAK, THOUGHTS ON AN INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
SYSTEM BASED FULLY ON THE SDR (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 28, 1979); Kenen, The Use of the SDR
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The par value system of schedule C in the IMF's Articles of Agreement goes
nowhere near as far as a common currency system. It is, however, about as tight
a set of arrangements as one can realistically imagine being instituted in a world
of many nation states of great economic and social diversity. While the par value
arrangements of schedule C are keyed to the Fund's making a "determination"
under article IV, section 4, that is loaded with considerations,29 section 2(c) can
be used to provide for arrangements similar to those of schedule C that embody
a concept of "central rates," rather than par values, without a comparable formal
determination being required.3 ° Central rates could be expressed in terms of a
common denominator (such as the SDR) with rates in currency exchange
transactions to be maintained on the basis of them.31
When one compares the extremely loose general exchange arrangements
provided for in section 2(b) with a harmonized central rate system similar to the
par value system of schedule C, it becomes apparent that the scope for potential
application of section 2(c) is very wide indeed. Joseph Gold has said that section
2(c) encompasses "all kinds of possibilities." 32 As in other creative endeavors,
it may clear the mind to "brainstorm." IMF Executive Directors did just that in
two meetings two days before Christmas 1975. Ideas for potential future use of
section 2(c) included:
(a) Arrangements that contemplate that authorities in each participating country will
establish and announce "target zones" for exchange rates in those cases where
authorities decide not to make commitments to stable rates.
33
(b) Arrangements that include defined narrow margins of fluctuation around central
rates for those countries participating, without necessarily adopting a common
to Supplement or Substitute for Other Means of Finance, in INTERNAMONAL MoNEY AND CREDr: Ti
POUcY Rot.Es 327 (G. von Furstenberg ed. 1983); Speech by W. Martin, "Toward a World Central
Bank?" (Per Jacobsson Lecture 1970).
29. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16. The IMF cannot under sec. 2(c) put into place
an exchange rate system in which members are expected to establish "par values" for their
currencies. See Minutes of IMF Executive Board Meeting of Dec. 23, 1975, IMF Doc. EBMI75/207
(1975) at 7, 9, reprinted in 2 DocumEmNs, supra note 1, at 2120, 2126, 2128.
30. Joseph Gold mentioned the possibility of using art. IV, sec. 2(c), to provide for general
exchange arrangements embodying central rates when the IMF Executive Board discussed sec. 2(c)
when it was still in draft. See Minutes of IMF Executive Board Meeting of Dec. 23, 1975, IMF Doc.
EBM75/206 (1975) at 14-15, reprinted in 2 Docutmawrs, supra note 1, at 2103, 2116-17; see also
EXCHANGE RATES, supra note 3, at 120.
31. In actual operation central rate and par value systems might be very similar, the main
difference being terminology, not economics. The Fund, if it provided for "central rate"
arrangements, would have more flexibility in modifying, terminating, or moving beyond those
arrangements compared to its more limited ability to modify or terminate sch. C's par value
arrangements.
32. Minutes of IMF Executive Board Meeting of Dec. 23, 1975, IMF Doc. EBM/75/206 (1975)
at 16, reprinted in 2 DocutrrEm, supra note 1, at 2103, 2118.
33. See comments of Pieter Lieftinck (Netherlands), IMF Doc. EBMJ75/206 (1975) at 15,
reprinted in 2 DocuMNTws, supra note 1, at 2103, 2117. The IMF can give advice on target zones
without the necessity of a decision under sec. 2(c). EXCHANGE RATES, supra note 3, at 454-55. See
generally infra notes 53, 54 and accompanying text.
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denominator (much as subsections (i) and (ii) of section 2(b) admit the coexistence of
multiple denominators). 34
(c) Arrangements that prepare the groundwork for a possible later decision, to be made
under section 4, to put into place the par value system of schedule C. An example would
be arrangements that include provisions concerning intervention and settlement. 35
(d) Central rate arrangements that are essentially equivalent to the par value
arrangements of schedule C. Each participating country would state a central rate for
its currency against a common denominator (perhaps the SDR). The arrangements
would include defined margins of permitted fluctuation and formal procedures to be
followed when a participating country proposes to change a central rate.3 6
(e) If and when schedule C is in operation, section 2(c) could be used to harmonize
the par value system of schedule C with the exchange arrangements of countries that
choose not to establish par values for their currencies or, after establishing par values,
cease to maintain them.
3 7
(f) If the par value system of schedule C is bypassed, arrangements might in the
future go beyond the conception of that system and be more highly integrated. 3"
III. Thoughts on a First Use of Section 2(c)
The time has come for the International Monetary Fund to use the enabling
power in section 2(c) of article IV to provide for general exchange arrangements
to replace those provided for in section 2(b). The objective of a first decision
should not be to define a perfect set of general arrangements. The objective, in
light of the evolution of the international monetary system since 1976, should
simply be to provide a good taxonomy of exchange arrangements that at the present
time and in the immediate future are consistent with section 1 of article IV.
The need for a section 2(c) decision is apparent when one sees how unhelpful
section 2(b) is at the present time. Section 2(b) sets forth three classes of
permitted exchange arrangements, the last category being "other exchange
arrangements of a member's choice." 39 The original expectation was that this
last category would be used by a few countries, like the United States, Canada,
Japan, and the United Kingdom with active exchange markets, that choose to
"float" the rates of their currencies. In fact, some forty-four IMF members have
at the present time chosen "more flexible" exchange arrangements (independent
floating, managed floating, or frequent rate adjustments) that do not fit into either
of the first two categories listed in section 2(b) and can only be accommodated
34. See comments of Emilio Sacerdoti (Italy), IMF Doc. EBM/75/207 (1975) at 5, reprinted in
2 DocuMENTs, supra note i, at 2120, 2124.
35. See comments of Eckard Pieske (Fed. Rep. Germany), IMF Doc. EBM/75/206 (1975) at 16,
reprinted in 2 DocuMEws, supra note 1, at 2103, 2118; and IMF Doc. EBM/75/207 (1975) at 10,
reprinted in 2 DocutENarrs, supra note 1, at 2120, 2129.
36. See supra notes 30 and 31 and accompanying text.
37. See comments of Eckard Pieske (Fed. Rep. Germany) and Joseph Gold, IMF Doc.
EBM/75/207 (1975) at 4-5, 10, reprinted in 2 DocUMEwrs, supra note 1, at 2120, 2123-24, 2129.
38. See comments of Byanti Kharmawan (Indonesia), IMF Doc. EBM/75/207 (1975) at 8-9,
reprinted in 2 Documawrs, supra note 1, at 2120, 2127-28.
39. See supra text accompanying note 11.
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under the residual "other exchange arrangements" category.4° One should
probably also add some thirty-nine countries that currently "peg" the exchange
rates of their currencies to the U.S. dollar.4' These arrangements are unilateral
and not cooperative and thus do not fit section 2(b)(ii) ("cooperative arrange-
ments by which members maintain the value of their currencies in relation to the
value of the currency or currencies of other members"). 42 The result is that the
exchange arrangements of more IMF members are in the residual category than
in the other two categories combined.
The authority of section 2(c) should be used to define an entirely new set of
categories of exchange arrangements- categories that fit the development of the
international monetary system. The section 2(c) decision should provide each
IMF member with a choice among a small number of types of exchange
arrangements adequate to accommodate the reasonable needs of virtually all
members. The residual "other exchange arrangements" category should not be
part of the section 2(c) decision.43
Fresh thinking will be necessary as definitions are worked out of exchange
arrangements appropriate to the development of the international monetary
system, even if the intent is more to describe than prescribe. Relevant policy and
operational criteria should be used in the definitions. Obviously, economic
factors must be taken into account. The author is not an economist and will make
only a few general observations from a legal perspective.
Exchange arrangements that are fundamentally different should not be lumped
together because their economic consequences appear similar. The IMF Staff's
present classification scheme for its published tables displaying exchange arrange-
ments is clearly deficient. 4 The Staff's categories, in their "first cut," use as the
criterion whether the member does or does not use a pegged exchange rate for its
currency with margins of fluctuation of "t 4.5 percent or less from the pegged rate.
Each of the two principal categories is ultimately divided into five subcategories.
45
The author submits that the most important distinction for policy purposes is whether
a country's exchange arrangement is governmentally administered or is market
based, which does not figure at all in the IMF's ten-category scheme.
The majority of IMF member countries require their residents to surrender
foreign exchange obtained from export and other transactions to the monetary
40. See the "Exchange Rate Arrangements as of March 31, 1988" table in 1988 IMF ANN. REP. 87.
41. Id.
42. If "another denominator" in sec. 2(b)(i) is interpreted to include the U.S. dollar, then these
pegged arrangements could be said to fall into that category. See R. EDWARDs, supra note 2, at 523.
Sir Joseph Gold places them in the residual "other exchange arrangements" category. EXCHANGE
RATmS, supra note 3, at 116.
43. Under sec. 2(c), members have the explicit right to choose exchange arrangements of their
choice, consistent with the purposes of the Fund and their obligations under art. IV, sec. 1, and do
not need to be reminded of that right.
44. See supra note 40.
45. The categories are as follows:
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authorities. 46 In many of these countries, the central bank is a monopoly supplier
of foreign exchange and provides foreign currency to commercial banks for only
authorized payments. The country's government or central bank decrees the
prices (exchange rates) at which commercial banks buy and sell foreign
currencies in transactions with their customers. 4 7 Such an exchange rate
arrangement might be described as an "administered exchange arrangement."
At the opposite pole from such an administered arrangement is a market-
oriented arrangement. The United States, United Kingdom, and Canada have
paradigm forms of such an arrangement. The United States, for example, has
virtually no exchange controls except for military security purposes and for the
tracing of funds in unlawful drug transactions. Commercial banks are allowed to
buy and sell foreign currencies, to extend credit in foreign currencies, and to deal
freely with residents and nonresidents. The government does not prescribe ex-
change rates. Exchange rates are determined primarily by demand and supply
conditions in the exchange market. United States' policies on official intervention
in the market have varied during the last dozen years. 48 Given the size of the
exchange market for the dollar, market interventions by U.S. authorities have been
relatively infrequent and usually relatively small in size. For example, during the
entire year of 1986, U.S. monetary authorities did not intervene at all. 49
PEGGED RATE ARRANGEMENT









Arrangement of Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
and United Arab Emirates
European Monetary System
More Flexibility
Rate Adjusted According to set of Indicators
Other Managed Floating
Independent Floating
46. Currency surrender requirements are essential to an administered exchange arrangement but
are not necessarily inconsistent with market-oriented arrangements. About 80 percent of the IMF's
members had currency surrender requirements at the end of 1987. See 1988 IMF ANNUAL REPORT ON
EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS AND EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 544-49. Currency surrender requirements are
described in R. EDWARDS, supra note 2, at 383-86.
47. R. EDWARDS, supra note 2, at 386-89.
48. See generally id. at 532-35; Y. FuNABASHI, MANAGING THE DOLLAR: FROM THE PLAZA TO THE
LouvRE (1988).
49. BD. OF GovERcoRs OF FED. RESERvE Sys., 73D ANN. REP. 31 (1986). U.S. authorities have on
a few occasions intervened heavily, or indicated their intention to do so, in order to move an exchange
rate in a direction judged more appropriate. This happened in November 1978. See R. EDWARDs,
supra note 2, at 533-34.
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The use of market-oriented exchange rate arrangements is not limited to a small
group of highly industrialized countries. During the 1980s a number of developing
countries changed from administered exchange arrangements to market-oriented
arrangements while retaining currency surrender requirements.
50
There are subvarieties of governmentally administered and market-oriented
exchange arrangements for which a section 2(c) decision must make provision.
For example, in a number of countries in which foreign exchange is not
centralized, monetary authorities publish rate ranges (usually in the form of an
"official" rate of some type with defined margins on either side of it), and
markets are allowed relatively free play within the published margins. The
central bank will intervene as a buyer or seller of last resort at the margins and
may also intervene at other times to keep market rates within the margins. When
market rates press against margins for more than a temporary period, official
rates may be changed to accommodate the market movement; in addition, or as
an alternative, various financial and economic policy actions may be adopted
(such as changes in credit terms, interest rates, and exchange controls) in order
to encourage market rates to approximate more closely the official rate.
A market-based system that uses official rates and relatively insignificant
exchange controls and a system in which the government has a monopoly power
over foreign exchange and promulgates governmentally decreed rates may each
produce stable exchange rates. The roles of the monetary authorities in the two
types of systems are, however, so different that the two systems should be kept
separated in a section 2(c) decision.
A taxonomy of exchange arrangements should take account of the role of capital
controls in different arrangements. Nominal rate stability is easier to achieve when
capital controls are employed. Liberalization of capital movements, however, may
have benefits that outweigh stability of nominal exchange rates.5 1 The Deputies
of the Group of Ten in a report in June 1985 stated: "The Deputies agree that
controls on international capital flows do not offer a desirable or effective means
of achieving greater exchange rate stability . . . . [F]ree capital movements are
beneficial to the expansion of trade and to efficient resource allocation."
52
50. See P. QUIRK, B. CHRISTENSEN, K. HuH & T. SASAIU, FLOATING EXCHANGE RATES IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: EXPERIENCE WITH AUCTION AND INTERBANK MARKETS (IMF Occasional Paper No. 53, 1987).
51. The members of the IMF in art. IV, sec. 1, recognize that an essential purpose of the
international monetary system is to provide a framework that facilitates the movement of capital. The
IMF's principal decision on surveillance of exchange rate policies states that an IMF member's
"introduction or substantial modification for balance of payments purposes of restrictions on, or
incentives for, the inflow or outflow of capital" may indicate the need for special discussion with the
member. Executive Board Decision No. 5392, supra note 10. See generally R. Edwards, supra note
2, at 449-60, 551-54.
52. REPORT OF THE DEPTms OF THE GROUP OF TEN: THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM para. 25 (June 1985), reprinted in 14 IMF SURVEY (Supp. on Group of 10
Deputies' Report, July 1985); A. CRocKErr & M. GOLDSTEIN, STRENGTHENING THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM: EXCHANGE RATES, SURVEILLANCE, AND OBJECTIVE INDICATORS 44 (IMF Occasional
Paper No. 50, 1987).
WINTER 1989
838 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
There may be a temptation when formulating a section 2(c) decision to try
to move the United States and the countries issuing currencies that are most
actively traded against the dollar (German mark, Japanese yen, Canadian
dollar, U.K. pound sterling) in the direction of establishing and announcing,
following periodic consultation, what are called "target zones" for exchange
rates of the dollar against actively traded currencies. "Target zones" are
ranges within which the authorities intend to maintain or direct exchange rates
but without undertaking any formal commitment to do so. 53 While it is
appropriate for provisions in a section 2(c) decision concerning market-based
exchange arrangements to include arrangements that use target zones, the
decision should also accommodate market-based systems that give a wide play
to market forces and do not involve commitments to either stable rates or
target zones.54
A decision that provides for general exchange arrangements under section
2(c), which requires an 85 percent majority of the Fund's total voting power, can
be supplemented by Fund decisions under article IV, sections 2(a) and 3,
requiring only a simple majority of voting power, relating to notification of
exchange arrangements and Fund surveillance over exchange rate policies. For
example, and this is intended here only as an example, the Fund might request
members to submit official forecasts of exchange rate ranges. This would be a
step short from recommending that member countries establish target zones for
the rates of their currencies.
To facilitate uniformity of presentation and analysis of forecasted rates, each
IMF member might be requested to forecast rates for its currency in relation to
the SDR or one of the five national currencies that compose the "basket" in
terms of which the SDR is currently valued (French franc, German mark,
Japanese yen, U.K. pound sterling, and U.S. dollar).55 The issuers of the five
53. The concept of "target zones" and official attitudes toward them are discussed in
A. CRocKErr & M. GoLOsrEiN, supra note 52, at 12-15; EXCHANGE RATEs, supra note 3, at 393-405,
447-59; J. Wn.LIAMSON, THE EXCHANGE RAT SYsTEM 62-78 (1983). See also paras. 32 and 103 of
Group of Ten report of June 1985, supra note 52; and paras. 5 and 66-67 of Group of Twenty-four
report of Aug. 1985, reprinted in 14 IMF SURvEY (Supp. on Group of 24 Deputies' Report, Sept.
1985), and in A. CROCKErr & M. Gows-mnq, supra note 52, at 60.
54. The finance ministers and central bank governors of the Group of Five (France, Federal
Republic of Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States) and the Group of Seven (Group
of Five plus Canada and Italy) have agreed from time to time on desired ranges of rates among their
currencies and have intervened in the market accordingly. See communiquds issued following
meeting of Group of Five at the Plaza Hotel, New York, Sept. 22, 1985, and following meeting of
Group of Five plus Canada at the Louvre, Paris, Feb. 22, 1987. 14 IMF SURVEY 296, 297 (1985); 16
IMF SuavEY 73, 75 (1987). No communiqud was issued after the Group of Seven meeting in
Washington, Feb. 3, 1989. N.Y.Times, Feb. 4, 1989, at 18, col. 1.
Exchange market intervention is a monetary policy tool that U.S. authorities have preferred to use
sparingly. Favored instruments operate primarily on the domestic money supply and interest rates.
They affect exchange rates, but they are not designed for the fine tuning of them.
55. The IMF's basic SDR valuation decision is Executive Board Decision No. 6631 (80/145)
G/S (1980), 1981 IMF ANN . RaP. 142-43; SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 10, at 324-25. The most
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currencies (the Group of Five) would be requested to forecast the rate ranges of
their currencies against the SDR.56 The forecasts might be submitted, say,
quarterly and relate to the next six months. After the Fund gains experience in
using the rolling forecasts as a surveillance tool, it could decide whether the
forecasts (or papers based on them) should be published. Experience might also
lead the IMF to consider how it might endow the SDR with an improved
capability to be a denominator for exchange rate purposes.57 At the present time
it does not function well in that role.
58
As experience is gained in forecasting future exchange rate ranges, authorities
may find it possible to sharpen their estimates and to improve their ability to
gauge the pace of rate movements in varying circumstances. The exercise may
also give a new dimension to the examination of underlying economic and
financial conditions and policies.
Economic forecasting is part of sound governmental planning. There is no
reason to exclude exchange rates from that process. Consultation (and perhaps
publicity) in the official forecasting of exchange rates should promote stability in
the total exchange rate system. Rate predictability and rate stability are not
necessarily the same. The proposal made here opts for rate predictability and
system stability over nominal rate stability.
IV. Conclusion
Section 2(c) of article IV of the Articles of Agreement enables the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund to be creative as future exchange rate systems are
contemplated. Unlike schedule C and section 4 of article IV, there are no
preconditions to its use. Section 2(c) permits the Fund to take one step at a time
recent adjustment of weights of the five currencies was made effective Jan. 1, 1986. Executive Board
Decision No. 8160 (85/186) G/S (1985); 1986 IMF ANN. REP. 102-03; SELECTED DECISIONS, supra
note 10, at 326.
56. Consultations among the issuers of the five currencies would be necessary if the forecasts are
to be mutually consistent. Since the SDR is issued by the IMF and is its unit of account, the IMF's
Managing Director should participate in the consultations among the Group of Five as they
harmonize forecasted rates against the SDR. A graph showing rates of the five currencies in relation
to the SDR during the 12-year period 1974-1985 appears in ROLE OF SDR, supra note 27, at 55.
Monetary authorities of the countries participating in the European Monetary System, who already
consult frequently, would have to harmonize their communications to the Fund. Since two EMS
currencies (Freqch franc and German mark) are included in the SDR "basket," no internal changes
in the EMS system would be required. See generally Guitian, The European Monetary System: A
Balance Between Rules and Discretion, in POLICY COORDINATION IN THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM
3 (IMF Occasional Paper No. 61, 1988); Russo & Tullio, Monetary Policy Coordination Within the
European Monetary System: Is There a Rule?, in POLICY COORDINATION IN THE EUROPEAN MONETARY
SYSTEM, supra.
57. See generally ROLE OF SDR, supra note 27.
58. As of March 31, 1988, only seven IMF member countries pegged the exchange rates of their
currencies to the SDR. These seven countries did not have active exchange markets. 1988 IMF ANN.
REP. 87.
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or to make changes by leaps toward a better exchange rate system. It also permits
the Fund to take steps "backward" or to change direction when that seems wise.
The time has come for scholars and officials to propose and debate how and
when the "interesting" section 2(c) should be used to improve the arrangements
under which currencies are exchanged and valued. Improved exchange arrange-
ments should facilitate international transactions in goods, services, and capital.
They should create a framework that permits public and private decision-makers
to take a longer-term perspective when making economic decisions. Fundamen-
tal purposes for which the International Monetary Fund was established are at
stake. 59
59. See IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 6, art. I(ii), art. IV, sec. 1.
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